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Pop-up Advertising - Grey Areas in the Context
of Copyright Law
Vikrant Narayan Vasudeva *
I. INTRODUCTION
Pop-up advertising is a form of interstitial advertisement involving the
simultaneous appearance to the computer user of a webpage containing an
advertisement which is on top of the webpage, intended to be visited, and
covers either part or all of the screen. Usually to reach a desired link the user
must first close the advertisement. Companies such as Gator and WhenU
have created software that enable interposition of advertisements over ex-
isting webpages without the website operator's consent. The software re-
sides on the user's computer and is voluntarily downloaded as part of a
bundled software package.' As a condition for acquiring the free software,
the user may have to accept a licensing agreement that describes the software
to be downloaded and alerts the user that advertisements will appear as a
result of installation.2
This software generates pop-up ads on the basis of the contextual adver-
tising technique, so that when a computer with the software installed is used
to browse the Internet, the program selects advertisements "based on a pro-
prietary analysis of the consumer's immediate interests, as reflected by the
consumer's Internet browsing activity."3 Using a directory of commonly
used search phrases, commonly visited web addresses, and various keyword
algorithms, the software scans the user's Internet activity to determine
whether any of the terms, web addresses, or content match the information in
the directory. If a match occurs, the software program obtains an advertise-
ment and pops an ad on the computer monitor.4 Due to the software's track-
ing feature, precise targeting of users is made possible by generating
advertisements complimentary to their Internet browsing, yet the software
company does not have to share any advertising revenues with the original
site that triggered the delivery of its ads. This can certainly have substantial
economic impact on the revenues of the website on which such pop-up ads
are generated.
This advertising practice has been the impetus for several lawsuits
against Gator and WhenU, the two primary organizations practicing such
techniques. These lawsuits have raised several issues involving privacy,
* LL.M., 2008 (Intellectual Property Law), The George Washington University
Law School, Washington D.C.
1. U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723, 725 (E.D. Va.
2003).
2. Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 739 (E.D. Mich.
2003).
3. Id. at 738.
4. U-Haul Int'l, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d at 725-26.
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trademark, unfair competition, and copyright. The focus of this article is
solely on the copyright issues raised by pop-up advertising.
I. Two TYPES OF COPYRIGHT ISSUES
The pop-up advertising scenario raises two distinct issues regarding
copyright infringement: direct infringement and contributory infringement.
Display of ads over the content of plaintiff's websites has been alleged to
constitute direct infringement of the website owner's exclusive right "to dis-
play the copyrighted work publicly" and "to prepare derivative works based
upon the copyrighted work," as protected by the Copyright Act of 1976
(Copyright Act).5 In contrast, allegations of contributory infringement de-
pend on the argument that the pop-up companies "induce, cause or materially
contribute" to consumers initiating the defendant's software on their com-
puters, which results in an unlawful alteration of the websites.6
III. DIRECT INFRINGEMENT
The direct infringement issues involving the right to display the work
publicly and the right to create derivative works based on the original have
been a major source of discussion and concern in regards to Internet copy-
right protection.
A. Exclusive Right of Public Display
The argument against pop-up advertisers and supporting the website
owner's exclusive right of public display has its roots in contract theory. It
states that the website owners grant consumers a license to use and display
the site but prohibits the alteration of the site or its appearance. 7 Thus, ex-
ceeding the terms of the license constitutes copyright infringement. The pop-
ups alter the plaintiffs' pages by covering up a portion of each page. This
argument, however, has not carried much weight with courts.
First, by definition, to "display" a work means "to show a copy of it."
Courts have held that the right to display is not infringed, because the pop-up
ads are displayed in a separate window that has no physical relationship to
the window in which the webpage is displayed.8 The pop-up window never
alters or modifies any of the content on any of the webpages; it merely puts
something in front of the plaintiffs' content. 9 The Court further remarked
5. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
6. ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 621 n.l (4th Cir. 2001)
(quoting Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).
7. 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 485 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).




that to hold that computer users are limited in their use of the plaintiffs'
websites to viewing the websites without any obstructing windows or pro-
grams would subject countless computer users and software developers to
liability for copyright infringement and contributory copyright infringement;
since the modern computer environment in which the plaintiffs' websites ex-
ist allows users to obscure, cover, and change the appearance of browser
windows containing the plaintiffs' websites.o
Secondly, because Internet users download the pop-up generating
software, it is the users, not the pop-up advertisers, who are ultimately re-
sponsible for calling up the advertisements.I' One court noted that pop-up
companies do not show users any business website through its pop-up pro-
gram because it is the user who calls up the business website and not the
program.' 2 Furthermore, the company shows the computer user its own ad-
vertisements, not another business's copyrighted material.'3 The pop-up pro-
gram interacts with the user's computer to determine whether an
advertisement is appropriate, but does not actually reproduce or copy any
copyrighted material.'4 Therefore, it is "[u]ltimately . . . the computer user
who controls how windows are displayed on the computer desktop."'5 An
important aspect of the court's analysis in this case was that the user had
consented to the pop-up software license, which constitutes an authorization
of the pop-up ads. As a result, the ads were analogous to actions that other
authorized software produces on a user's computer.
B. Critical Appraisal
In the context of the Internet, the court in Kelly v. Ariba Soft Corp.
originally found a violation of the display right when "the defendants took an
active role in creating the display of the copyrighted images."6 The key
point in all of these cases is that courts have acknowledged the right of the
copyright owner to have his work displayed in a specific context. The legis-
lative history of the Copyright Act also offers some guidance, noting that
"[the concept of] public display cover[s] not only the initial rendition or
showing, but also any further act by which that rendition or showing is trans-
mitted or communicated to the public."'7 The history goes on to add that
10. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 485.





16. Kelly v. Ariba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934, 946 (9th Cir. 2002), affg in part,
rev'g in part 77 F. Supp. 2d 1116, withdrawn and superseded opinion on de-
nial of rehearing by 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2002).
17. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5676.
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"every method by which the images or sounds comprising a ... display are
picked up and conveyed is a 'transmission', and if the transmission reaches
the public in [any] form, the case comes within the scope of clauses (4) or (5)
of section 106."18 A generous reading in favor of protection would be that
when technological change has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Cop-
yright Act must be construed in light of its basic purpose to protect creative
expressiont9
It remains to be determined whether a modification must be permanent
or whether a substantial but temporary modification of the work infringes on
copyright rights. If a permanent modification is not required, then the screen
display observable to the user is certainly altered from what otherwise would
have been perceptible.
The court in 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com found that "any action
by a computer user that produced a computer window or visual graphic that
altered the screen appearance of Plaintiff's website, however slight, would
require Plaintiff's permission."20 However, the problem with the court's
holding is that it fails to acknowledge that although computer users have
rights over the display of their screens, based on the Copyright Act of 1976,
and these rights are subject to the rights of others. A user cannot use his
rights to achieve an objective impinging on the rights of another party. 2'
The concept of control over the display as mentioned by the court has
certain inadequacies. First, being able to close the window and being forced
to close the window are two different concepts. Computer users should not
have to close unauthorized pop-up advertisements in order to view a desired
webpage. Second, the people who use such bundled software packages must
agree before downloading the software to allow the launching of pop-up ad-
vertisements.22 Such consent has the effect of diluting the user's autonomy
argument because he or she has explicitly surrendered control. This of
course carries the counter argument that if a user should have some control
over his computer and online experience, it may logically follow that he
should also be able to contract away that control to a third-party in exchange
for some service or benefit.
The court in U-Haul Int'l v. WhenU.com, Inc. stated that the appearance
of a pop-up was equivalent to the display of an email notification window or
other pop-up system message.23 This is also questionable. System messages
18. Id. at 5678.
19. Id. at 5680.
20. 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 487 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
21. Id. at 509.
22. Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 739 (E.D. Mich.
2003).




are associated with specific functions of a computer's working. Pop-up ad-
vertisements, on the other hand, are not associated with any function but are
an imposition associated with the opening of specific websites that would not
ordinarily have occurred. Furthermore, system messages pop-up randomly
on the occurrence of an associated function; however, pop-up advertisements
are bound to occur on the opening of specific websites.
The U-Haul Int'l court noted that pop-up windows have no physical
relationship to the window in which the targeted webpage might appear. 24
This statement is also questionable. First, the pop-up advertisement does not
exist per se; it comes into existence only on the opening of the targeted web-
site. Second, when the pop-up advertisement is clicked, the pop-up ad closes
and either a new website is launched or the user's currently active Internet
browser window gets redirected to the designated webpage of the advertiser
featured in the ad. This suggests that the windows are not completely
separated.
C. Derivative Right
Courts have also disfavored plaintiffs' derivative right claims, In Wells
Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., the copyright holder's claim that a defen-
dant violated the right to create derivative works was treated as a contribu-
tory liability claim rather than a claim of direct liability.25 In that case, the
plaintiffs had failed to make the necessary showing that the defendants, and
not the computer users, incorporated the plaintiffs' web sites into a new
work.26 The court in U-Haul Int'l similarly found that the defendants were
not liable for contributory copyright infringement since consumers who
cause the display of the pop-up advertisements on their screens do not alter
plaintiffs' websites.27
In rejecting the derivative works claim in Wells Fargo, the court out-
lined the relevant legal test: "[a] derivative work must incorporate a protected
work in some concrete or permanent 'form."'28 Finding that the pop-up win-
dow failed this test in U-Haul Int'l, the court reasoned that it was distinct
from the targeted website and transitory because it "may not be exactly du-
plicated in. . . another user's computer."29 The court also noted that the pop-
ups modified the user's computer display, and not the targeted website.30
24. Id.
25. Wells Fargo & Co., 293 F. Supp. 2d at 769.
26. Id.
27. U-Haul Int'l, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d at 730.
28. Wells Fargo & Co., 293 F. Supp. 2d at 771; see also Lewis Galoob Toys Inc.,
v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 967 (C.A. Cal. 1992) (developing this
test).
29. U-Haul Int'l, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d at 731.
30. Id.
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As an alternative ground for denying plaintiffs' motion, the court in
Wells Fargo briefly entertained the idea that an "overlapping window could
be said to change the appearance of the underlying window on a computer
screen."31 Even if such was true, however, the court found that consumers
using defendant's program still do not create derivative works because the
way the sites are viewed is changed only momentarily.32 The court in Wells
Fargo held that "[a]s soon as the advertisements are 'disconnected'-that is,
closed or minimized-plaintiffs' sites revert to their original form."33
The plaintiffs in Wells Fargo claimed, however, that the modification of
the pixels that make up the image on the user's screen created a derivative
work.34 The court found this argument to fail for two reasons. First, the
plaintiffs did not have any property interest, let alone a copyright interest in
the content of computer users' pixels.35 Second, the modified pixels were not
sufficiently 'fixed' so as to qualify independently for copyright, which is a
necessary element in finding a derivative work has been created.36 Pixels
were updated every 1/70th of a second, which is too transitory to satisfy the
fixation requirement.37
As a result, even if the court was to accept that an overlying window on
a computer screen modified the appearance of an underlying window, it
could not be accepted that computer users prepared a derivative, indepen-
dently copyrightable work. Finally, the court once again underscored a prac-
tical reason for finding no infringement:
[I]f obscuring a browser window containing a copyrighted website
with another computer window produces a "derivative work,"
then any action by a computer user that produced a computer win-
dow or visual graphic that altered the screen appearance of Plain-
tiff's website, however slight, would require Plaintiff's
permission. A definition of "derivative work" that sweeps within
the scope of the copyright law a multi-tasking Internet shopper
whose word-processing program obscures the screen display of
Plaintiff's website is indeed "jarring."38
31. Wells Fargo & Co., 293 F.Supp. 2d at 769; see also Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v.
Nintendo of Am,, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1283, 1291 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
32. Wells Fargo & Co., 293 F.Supp. 2d at 769.
33. Id. at 770.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 770-71.
36. Id. at 771.
37. Id.





The Wells Fargo court's view notwithstanding, pop-up windows do not
always appear to be distinct from the windows over which they pop up. In
certain instances, clicking on a pop-up redirects the primary page displaying
a company's legitimate website.
Although the "transitory" finding was relevant because derivative works
must be independently copyrightable (and to be independently copyrightable,
a work must be fixed), the court mischaracterized this requirement. A work
is fixed when it is "sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be per-
ceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than
transitory duration."39 A website display certainly exists long enough to be
perceived by the user for as long as the user wants to view it. Furthermore,
contrary to the U-Haul Int'l court's assertion that the appearance of a pop-up
advertisement "is a transitory occurrence that may not be exactly duplicated"
on a particular computer, the tendency for the same advertisements to appear
attached with the same keywords on a specific website is quite high.40 Alter-
nately, it is not simply the same pop-up ad which should occur; it is just the
concept of viewing a window within a window abstractly, and this experi-
ence is certainly being duplicated every time. Further undercutting the
courts' approach to the fixation issue, the House Report accompanying the
1976 Copyright Act states that the right to prepare derivative works is
broader than the right of reproduction "in the sense that reproduction requires
fixation in copies or phonorecords, whereas the preparation of a derivative
work, such as a ballet, pantomime, or improvised performance, may be an
infringement even though nothing is ever fixed in tangible form." 4 1 This
seems to demonstrate that derivative works must be fixed to be copyrighted,
but not for purposes of infringement.42 In Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v.
Nintendo, the Ninth Circuit reached the same conclusion, stating that "[a]
derivative work must be fixed to be protected under the Act ... but not to
infringe."43 According to the court, this distinction is justified because the
definition of "copies" in the 1976 Act expressly incorporates the fixation
requirement, while the definition of "derivative work" does not mention the
fixation requirement.-
39. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2009).
40. U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723, 731 (E.D. Va.
2003).
41. SEN. REP. 94-473, reprinted in 8 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, App. 4[A]-106 (2007).
42. Id.
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The court's finding that the pop-ups only change the computer display
and not any of the targeted website's copyrighted materials is a limited per-
spective. Certainly, the pop-ups do not physically alter the targeted website.
They do, however, alter the functionality of the targeted website and limit its
intended expression. They cause the click-through sequence pertaining to a
website to be restructured, thus altering the user's experience and creating a
new format for presentation. The sequence of screens presented by a site
constitutes a copyrightable work, and due to an unauthorized insertion of
another window in that sequence, the exclusive right to derivative works has
been infringed.
"Derivative works" include those "based upon one or more preexisting
works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictional-
ization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridg-
ment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast,
transformed, or adapted."45 "A work consisting of editorial revisions, anno-
tations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an
original work of authorship, is a 'derivative work."'46 The text of the statu-
tory provisions seems broad enough to cover modifications to a website's
functionality.
Furthermore, the pop-up software does use the websites as a launching
pad for its work and, as was noted in Worlds of Wonder, Inc. v. Veritel
Learning Systems, the pop-up ad software would be worthless if it could not
use other companies' websites as a trigger to deliver its pop-ups to users'
screens.
4 7
Finally, while there might not be any observable direct physical interac-
tion, the pop-up software certainly does employ indirect interaction by look-
ing for a keyword match between the user's commands and its directory,
with the user's commands in turn being a derived expression of the targeted
website. This is then employed to launch a pop-up window, thus creating a
new expression based on and modifying the older expression-exactly the
sort of modification against which the derivative use right was designed to
protect.
IV. OTHER POSSIBLE ALLEGATIONS
To date, plaintiffs in these cases have raised issues of copyright in-
fringement based only on the display right and the derivative right issues.
However, in certain instances, certain other copyright issues could also be
explored.
45. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2009).
46. Id. (emphasis added).
47. Worlds of Wonder, Inc. v. Veritel Learning Sys., Inc., 658 F. Supp. 351, 352-
53 (N.D. Tex. 1986) (holding that a derivative works violation occurred when





The Copyright Act provides that "in the case of literary, musical, dra-
matic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other
audiovisual works," the copyright owner has the exclusive right to perform
the work publicly.48 To perform a work means "to recite, render, play, dance
or act it, either directly or by means of any device or process."49 Such de-
vices and processes may include "all kinds of equipment for reproducing or
amplifying sounds or visual images, any sort of transmitting apparatus, any
type of electronic retrieval system, and any other techniques and systems not
yet in use or even invented."50 To perform a work publicly means "to trans-
mit or otherwise communicate a performance ... of the work to [any place
where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family
and its social acquaintances is gathered]51 or to the public, by any device or
process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the perform-
ance . . . receive it in the same place or in separate places"52 Based on the
principle of ejusdem generis, "otherwise communicate" has been construed
as relating to "transmit."53 Therefore, "one must conclude that under the
transmit clause a public performance at least involves sending out some sort
of signal via a device or process to be received by the public at a place
beyond the place from which it is sent." 54 Thus, the act of broadcasting a
work is itself a performance of that work.55 Furthermore, even if such a
broadcast is received in the privacy of an individual's home, it is nevertheless
a "public" performance.56 In the case of a motion picture or other audiovi-
sual work, a performance occurs by act of "show[ing] its images in any se-
quence or mak[ing] the sounds accompanying it audible."57
In a recent case, the defendants installed a device that monitored the
signal received by a television set. 58 When the signal switched from a pro-
gram to an advertisement, the device caused the television to display content
provided by the device, typically other advertisements. When the show re-
48. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2002).
49. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
50. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 63 (1976).
51. 17 U.S.C. § 101(1).
52. 17 U.S.C. § 101(2).
53. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Prof I Real Estate Investors, Inc., 866 F.2d
278, 281 (9th Cir. 1989).
54. Id. at 282.
55. See Schumann v. Albuquerque Corp., 664 F. Supp. 473, 476 (D.N.M. 1987).
56. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 157-58 (1975).
57. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2009).
58. ABC, Inc. v. Flying J, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13252, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
2007).
2009]
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started, the device switched the television's display back to the content pro-
vided by the signal. Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that it was not an infringement of the broadcaster's performance right
was denied.59
In the Internet context, the situation described above is analogous to a
pop-up advertisement covering the advertisement on the targeted website and
displaying its own advertisement. A website may not always be text-related.
For example, in certain instances the website may involve flash movies or a
live feed. In some instances, as soon as a website is opened, such perform-
ances commence without any initiation by the user. In such an instance, if an
advertisement juxtaposes on the website, then the performance right of the
website has probably been infringed.
B. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings
Section 106(6) of the Copyright Act creates the right "in the case of
sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a
digital audio transmission."60 Through "the 'Digital Performance Right in
Sound Recordings Act of 1995,' Congress conferred performance rights on
sound recordings."61 When section 106 was drafted in 1976, it contained five
particular rights, and the performance right was circumscribed to exclude
sound recordings.62 Instead of simply amending that feature to add sound
recordings to the works that could claim a public performance right, Con-
gress added a new paragraph to section 106 conferring the right "in the case
of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a
digital audio transmission."63 This reference in section 106(6) to "digital au-
dio transmission" suggests a qualitative limitation on the right. This law at-
tempts to create a public performance right in sound recordings limited to:
(1) transmissions, as opposed to live performances (2) of audio works, as
opposed to audiovisual works, (3) that occur in digital format, as opposed to
analog and (4) even as to digital audio transmissions, attaching at enactment
almost exclusively to subscription and interactive services.64
Many websites play music online and such performances often begin
without any initiation by the user. In such an instance if an advertisement
juxtaposes on the website, then the digital performance right of the website
has probably been infringed.
59. Id.
60. 17 U.S.C. §106(6) (2000).
61. See 2-8 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 8.21[B] (2008).
62. See id.





Moral rights in the online context are not yet recognized; however, with
the virtual presence of every physical embodiment increasing every day, an
accommodation may have to be reached soon. This becomes more evidenct
as online interfaces emphasize the aesthetics of the interfaces over any other
aspect.
A concept known as the integrity right grants the author a right to pre-
vent distortion, truncation, and mutilation of his work. Nimmer recognizes
that "the exclusive right 'to prepare derivative works' could be conceptual-
ized as an author's integrity right, particularly when augmented with provi-
sions and interpretations arising under statutes other than the Copyright
Act."65
Furthermore, the case of Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies
suggests a deeper interest in an author's integrity.66 In Gilliam, the court
observed that "the ability of the copyright holder to control his work remains
paramount in our copyright law" and that "copyright law should be used to
recognize the important role of the artist in our society."67 The court held it
likely that the plaintiffs would succeed in demonstrating "an actionable muti-
lation" of their work.68 An action "seeking redress for deformation of an
artist's work" is one that "finds its roots in the continental concept of droit
moral, or moral right, which may generally be summarized as including the
right of the artist to have his work attributed to him in the form in which he
created it."69
In United States v. Microsoft Corp., , the court also touched on copy-
right law in addition to the well-known antitrust concerns. 70 The court ruled
that Microsoft protected the monopoly in its Windows operating system by
placing illegal conditions on its licenses with Original Equipment Manufac-
turers (OEMs).7 1 Microsoft defended the license restrictions by construing
Gilliam to lay down the blanket rule "that a copyright holder may limit a
licensee's ability to engage in significant and deleterious alterations of a
copyrighted work."72 Though rejecting Microsoft's basic copyright defense
as borderline 'frivolous,' the court accepted Microsoft's argument as applied
to one hypothetical fact pattern: "[wle agree that a shell that automatically
prevents the Windows desktop from ever being seen by the user is a drastic
65. Id. at § 8D.02.
66. See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co. Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 21 (2d Cir. 1976).
67. See id. at 21-23.
68. See id. at 23-24.
69. Id. at 24.
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alteration of Microsoft's copyrighted work, and outweighs the marginal an-
ticompetitive effect of prohibiting the OEMs from substituting a different
interface automatically upon completion of the initial boot process."73
D. Fair Use Analysis
If copyright infringement is found, then it is likely that the pop-up ad-
vertisers will raise a defense of fair use. Section 107 of the Copyright Act,
which embodies the doctrine of fair use, states that "the fair use of a copy-
righted work ... is not an infringement of copyright."74 Section 107 further
provides examples of the kinds of use that might be fair, including uses "for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research."75 Fair use is an
affirmative defense in which the defendant has the burden of proof and per-
suasion. However, the applicability of the doctrine is limited. For example,
the court in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes declined to extend the
fair-use defense.76 That court concluded that Congress, in its legislative his-
tory, could not have meant that the fair use defense applied to actions where
the defendants are not sued for copyright infringement but for offering and
providing technology designed to circumvent technological measures that
control access to copyrighted works.77 The distinction here is that an unau-
thorized advertiser may be entitled to non-infringing use of their advertise-
ments to serve the public good and social science.
Finally, section 107 directs that a fair use defense should include an
analysis of four factors: (1) the purpose and character of the use, (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work, (3) the amount and substantiality of the por-
tion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.78 The
factors contained in section 107 are merely by way of example, and are not
an exhaustive enumeration. This means that factors other than those enumer-
ated could have a bearing upon the determination of fair use. 79
Under the first factor, if the nature of the use is commercial, it is pre-
sumptively unfair.80 Pop-up advertisers use websites to launch not just com-
73. Id.
74. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2009).
75. See id.
76. See University City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 323
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
77. Id.
78. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
79. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05
(2008).
80. See Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1481 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Sony
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)).
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mercial activity, but commercial activity that interferes with other
companies' commercial use of their own websites; thus, this factor discour-
ages a fair use finding. Using a mode of communication free from the fees
and expenses that are usually incurred by the authorized advertiser not only
impedes the existing advertising commerciality but also manipulates copy-
righted work for a commercial advantage. Furthermore, an advertisement to
sell any product is undoubtedly commercial; its sole purpose and method of
publication is designed to generate economic profit. Another issue in the
purpose and character analysis is to what extent the unauthorized advertiser's
use of copyrighted elements is "transformative."81 Here, the query is
"whether the new work merely 'supersede[s] the objects' of the original crea-
tion .... or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different
character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message."8 2 An
advertisement may add new expression, meaning, and message, but the in-
fringing work heavily depends on the copyrighted website to transmit the
unauthorized advertisement. Without the original copyrighted work (the
targeted website), the unauthorized advertisement could not exist. Thus,
without the copyrighted work and the website, there would be no work to
infringe upon. Such use is exploitive and should fail on this factor.
The second factor suggests use is unfair when copyrighted work is used
informatively rather than functionally.83 This factor would likely favor the
pop-up advertisers, given that the use of plaintiffs' web addresses to trigger
advertisements is more of a functional use than an informative use. How-
ever, this may not hurt a plaintiff's case because the second factor "typically
recedes into insignificance in the greater fair use calculus." 4
The third factor weighs against fair use if the entire work is copied and
otherwise leaves to the court's discretion the determination of whether too
much of the work has been used. As a pop-up is entirely dependent on a
user's call to a plaintiff's webpage, the entire targeted website is "used" in
the process that generates a pop-up. This factor would thus go against a
finding of fair use.
Finally, the fourth factor favors a finding of unfair use when the alleged
infringer's use of the material usurps demand for the original copyrighted
work. Since the intent of the pop-up software companies is to divert users
from the plaintiffs' sites to their competitors', this factor would appear to
support a finding of unfair use. Even if the economic harm is not immediate
or imminent, a future effect on the market is certainly probable, which is
inconsistent with a finding of fair use. Thus, since factors one, three, and
four tend to disfavor pop-up software companies' fair use claim, it is unlikely
81. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
82. Id.
83. See Diamond v. Am-Law Publ'g Corp., 745 F.2d 142, 148 (2d Cir. 1984).
84. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
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that a pop-up generator will be able to claim this defense if a court finds a
copyright infringement.
E. Contributory Infringement
"To make a prima facie case for contributory copyright infringement
there must actually be direct infringement."85 Finding that the plaintiff's
claim of copyright infringement failed, the Court in U-Haul int'l concluded
that the claim for contributory copyright infringement failed for the same
reasons.
86
Contributory liability is imposed on a defendant who, "with knowledge
of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the in-
fringing conduct of another."87 Prerequisite to contributory liability for copy-
right infringement is that the defendant must have aided or encouraged
someone who actually engaged in copyright infringement. The knowledge
element is satisfied if the defendant should have known about the infringing
activity, including where a defendant is "willfully blind." In the Ninth Cir-
cuit's words, "providing the site and facilities for known infringing activity is
sufficient to establish contributory liability."88
If a conclusion of copyright infringement is reached a similar conclu-
sion as to contributory infringement would probably follow. The pop-up ad-
vertiser's device served no other purpose than to encourage the alleged
infringing behavior, and it was capable of no non-infringing use.
V. CONCLUSION
As technology keeps evolving, the race to keep step with it is becoming
increasingly more difficult for traditional laws. The myriad of implications
become quite difficult to balance with the traditional concept of law. Copy-
right law has its basis in the evolution of technology, from the printing press
to the Internet. However, as a technologically driven law, copyright law
seems to be advocated and propagated more by the legislature than by the
judiciary. The judiciary has always sought an accommodation of rights
based on traditional concepts, seeking then to apply them to the future. Pop-
up advertisements are a very minor embodiment of this quandary. However,
here too, the judiciary seeks to apply traditional analogies to a new medium.
Derivative and display rights acquire a completely new meaning with a tran-
sition in this new online medium of communication. This is especially so in
a versatile and dynamic medium such as the internet. Accordingly, the nec-
85. U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F.Supp.2d 723, 730 (E.D. Va.
2003) (citing Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co., 158 F.3d 693, 706
(2d Cir. 1998)).
86. U-Haul Int'l, 279 F.Supp.2d at 730.
87. Matthew Bender, 158 F.3d at 706.
88. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996).
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essary resolution may have to be arrived at legislatively, rather than judi-
cially. In any case, while legislatures scramble to keep up with ever-
changing technological realities, courts must undertake the difficult task of
promulgating rules which can be readily applied to new technologies that are
outside the scope of old copyright statutes.

